By SALMAN RAFI SHEIKH
Discourse on democracy usually revolves around the assumption—largely held to be a fact—-that democracy is a potential source of unity in diversity. If that is true, we have solid reasons to believe that Pakistan is, finally, on the path to democracy.
The results of national elections held in May 2013 have clearly demonstrated that ethnicity or politics of ethnicity is increasing in Pakistan. This factor, in one sense, is quite negative; for, it was the very ethnic division that led to dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. However, under the current circumstances, it seems that the nature of ethnic politics has undergone some significant changes. Whereas, in 1971, no other party—other than Awami League— could win seats in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), latest elections, as opposed to exclusivity prevailing in 1970s, have shown two broad patterns of ethnic politics: not only have four different parties formed governments in four province in Pakistan, but also all of them have gained substantial support in other provinces as well.
Where this trend has turned out to be a formal pronouncement of the passing away of the traditional Bhutto-anti Bhutto division prevailing since 1971, there it has also shown the new pattern of politics emerging, with consolidation of electoral politics as opposed to dictatorships.
Although ethnicity is still a major defining feature of Pakistan’s politics, and latest election has shown its operation, it has changed its shape in a rather contradictory fashion. Firstly, its impact on national politics has decreased as a result of expansion of electoral participation across various social classes. Secondly, ethnicity seems to have increased with regionalization of vote on the basis of four provinces of Pakistan. Electoral data suggests that class differences and regional (ethno-linguistic) differences have not disappeared, but the political process is providing a mechanism to manage them rather than allowing them to become a battle ground to display their ugly side.
The cardinal point of this transformation is, first and foremost, expansion of electoral participation. The voter turn-out in Pakistan has risen from a 25 year average score of 41 percent to around 55 percent in one big leap in 2013. This relatively high turn-out is not restricted to any particular area, region or province. This has happened in all of the provinces, including those areas of Baluchistan which are regarded as hinterland of insurgency, leading the Baluch nationalists to establish government in that deeply troubled province.
However, notwithstanding these figures, the election results have also shown that most of the parties are basically regionally based, with relatively insignificant support in other provinces and regions. For example, according to the figures collected by Gallup Pakistan, PML-N (90% of its nearly 15 million voters are in Punjab); PPP (50% in Sind; 42% in Punjab); PTI (70% in Punjab, 21% in KPK); MQM (98% in Karachi); JUI-F (75% in KPK; 12% in Baluchistan); ANP (83% in KPK). At first sight this creates a bit of a stir and scare. But as we look deeper, we can discover a different pattern which is not altogether unpleasant or even pessimistic as far as the political future of Pakistan is concerned.
These facts are quite illuminating: despite such regionalization of vote banks, the top three national political parties have substantial presence in other provinces. For example PML-N scored nearly one million votes in KPK and half a million in Sind; its coalition partner in Sind PML-F won nearly one million. As such, the national character of PML-N has emerged through a process of coalition building rather than building a cross-province vote bank of its own. Similarly, both PPP and PTI scored significant votes outside the province where they won a majority and formed governments.
In a way, this regionalization of vote banks, and provincial base of political parties is, principally, not in conflict with the demands of the 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan. The amendment has principally devolved power from the centre to the provinces, and as such regionally based political parties can possibly concentrate their energies more towards regional development as a means of national development.
However, one should not let these figures sweep one’s judgement away. These figures, assessments and results do not, by any means, prove that problems of federation in Pakistan would not occur or those already persisting would find a quick fix.
Issues like distribution and management of water resources and distribution of financial resources under National Finance Commission Award (NFC) are likely to continue to cause inter-provincial friction. And, with regionalization of most of vote banks, regionally or provincially based parties can also use this platform as a stumbling block rather than as a stepping stone towards maturity of democracy.
But, given the fact that Pakistan has, for the first time in history, experienced transition from one democratically elected government to another elected government, there is every reason to say that democracy, in the ethnic context of Pakistan, does have the potential to accommodate these diverse elements and functionalise the dormant state into a robust governing institution. The bottom line is that democratic transition has opened up the way for all diverse elements in Pakistan to speak for themselves, and freely choose their representatives, no matter how many parties come to form government and how many sit in the Parliament as opposition. This trend is most likely to pave the way for gradual emergence of a stable political culture, followed by socio-economic stability.
