In his latest visit (13 February 2014) to Turkey to discuss the ‘future, of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, focused on the ways and means of establishing more constructive engagement with Afghanistan rather than ‘dominating’ it the way Pakistan had been attempting to do it in the past. However, this ‘review’ of the policy towards Afghanistan is not a mere political game; rather, it is a strong manifestation of the “regional” pivot Pakistan has been trying to make for a few years now. It is, in one way, a consequence of and a response to the US led ‘war on terror’ and now the approaching drawdown of the US forces from Afghanistan.
The thirteen years long US-Afghan war has affected a number of countries in the region in one way or another. But Pakistan is that country which suffered the most despite being the ‘non-NATO’ ally of the US led coalition forces. One of the major affects of this war and that of the consequent events leading to the probable withdrawal on Pakistan is discernible in terms of a ‘new’ foreign policy outlook. It would be no exaggeration to say that a sort of “regional pivot” or “regionalisation” of foreign policy has gradually emerged in the policy circles, leading Pakistan to engage more closely with its neighbours, including Afghanistan and India—-its two most immediate neighbours with which Pakistan historically has not enjoyed good relations—and with Iran and Russia as well. Prospects of withdrawal have only given a new push to this “pivot”, which has also affected Pak-US bilateral relations negatively. It is against this backdrop that one needs to understand the West’s carrot and stick policy towards Pakistan. For example, on the one hand, the US is putting pressure on Pakistan to release Shakil Afridi, who is currently under arrest for abetting the US in killing Osama Bin Laden in 2011, in order for the continuity of US aid, and on the other hand, the US has, through the EU, tried to ‘appease’ Pakistan by giving it GPS plus status for exporting goods and commodities to the markets of the EU.
This shift, in one way, has essentially emerged in response to the US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. By making this “regional” pivot, Pakistan aims to facilitate its access to vast energy resources of Central Asia as well as secure long term geo-economic gains such as increasing trade with India and other neighbours and making itself a corridor of trade and energy from Central to South Asia. Consequently, Pakistan has started reaching out to the traditionally hostile non-Pashtun Afghan leaders of the erstwhile Northern Alliance, and has also diversified regional and international relations—as is manifest in Pakistan’s increasingly warming up of relations with Russia and Central Asian states, expanding strategic partnership with China, (as is evident in Pakistan’s handing the Gwadar port over to China), and also in limited energy-centric amity with Iran.
It is evident that Pakistan’s “regional pivot” has multiple dimensions, ranging from local to national and regional. Not only does it aim at securing geo-economic interests but also geo-political and strategic through this new policy outlook, which is emerging, taking definite shape, although gradually yet perceptibly. However, it does have its consequences too. For instance, Pakistan does have to manage its alliance with the US as well, which is one of the major causes of conflict in Pakistan, not to mention how the US itself would respond to this “pivot”, especially towards the conclusion of Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan. Although Pakistan’s new approach towards Afghanistan is part of its “regional pivot”, there is little to argue otherwise that settlement of conflict in Afghanistan is at its heart; for, with conflict going on in Afghanistan, Pakistan also cannot hope to have peace at home.
